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tepav@tepav.org.tr / tepav.org.trTEPAV veriye dayalı analiz yaparak politika tasarım sürecine katkı sağlayan, akademik etik ve kaliteden ödün vermeyen, kar amacı gütmeyen, partizan olmayan bir araştırma kuruluşudur.
Thirty years have passed and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or  the PKK, problem is now in a new phase. The conflict took so long that  the world, the region and Turkey have all changed. Recent attacks have  divided society and made ethnic and religious identities more visible.  They have transformed political and psychological expectations. In the  meantime, the government once again reluctantly sat down at the table  with the PKK.
The process poses serious risks for the AKP.  Erdoğan knows these risks and is trying hard to minimize them. Still,  his preferred method of “open negotiations” puts him in a difficult  position.
The most important factor making the management of the  process immensely difficult is divided public opinion. Erdoğan not only  faces the reaction of the opposition, but also trying to keep in line  three different groups under the AKP umbrella. First, there are the  “Turks,” the vast majority of the AKP electorate. They have so far  preferred to silently watch the process, but we can still feel their  discontentment. Secondly, there are the “integrated Kurds” facing the  biggest challenge. They live side by side with the Turks and fear being  subjected to social, political and economic discrimination if the PKK gains more legitimacy. Finally, there are the “Islamist Kurds,” the historic and ideological rivals of the PKK.
Erdoğan  has very limited means to keep all these groups in line. Though not in  perfect shape, one useful tool is the multi-party political order. This  is the means by which Erdoğan has been able to gather different  identities under the same political roof.
The second and most  important strategic tool is, of course, the free market economy. The  growth of the Turkish economy together with the development of a middle  class despite the global crisis provides common ground for different  groups. Wealth cements them around the principle of “political stability  for common economic interest.”
The third tool is Islam and the  mosques and graveyards where it is practiced. Erdoğan’s whole discourse  stresses Islam as a common denominator in reference to the Koran and the  Prophet’s life. Mosques play a critical role insofar as they bring  together people with different origins five times a day, load them with  common emotions, and release them back into everyday life.
Although  his leadership capacity and preference to take and implement decisions  quickly with a small team confer Erdoğan particular advantages, such an  approach might not be suitable for managing public opinion in the face  of a fragile and complex ethnic problem. Come what may, Erdoğan is  giving it another shot and might be taking deadly risks.
This commentary is published on 28.02.2013 in Hürriyet Daily News.