TEPAV stated that if institutional design is prioritized over constitutional values or human rights, over-politicization, polarization and eventually the blockage of the process will be prevented to a certain degree.

ANKARA- TEPAV stated that prioritizing institutional design in constitution debates might enable a more fruitful constitution making process and said: "When institutional design is prioritized over constitutional values or human rights, over-politicization, polarization and eventually the blockage of the process will be prevented."

TEPAV Policy Note titled "Where to Start to Discuss the Constitution? The Importance of Constitutional Engineering in Constitution Debates" by Assoc. Prof. Levent Gönenç of Ankara University Faculty of Law was published.

The note maintained: "It can be recommended that when identifying the matters of debate in the constitution making process, check and balance mechanisms should be concentrated on and the establishment of relevant knowledge across experts and political parties should be prioritized." The note continued:

"It is doubtless that this strategy does not imply that the other two dimensions of the constitution will be left unnoticed or neglected; however, prioritizing or concentrating on the debates on institutional design might generate a more fruitful constitution making process. Besides, when institutional design is prioritized over constitutional values or human rights, over-politicization, polarization and eventually the blockage of the process will be prevented. If the process starts with and evolves from design, to other realms can be added to the debate agenda in tandem with the above framework."

The note stressed that establishment of appropriate institutional design and check and balance mechanisms and making appropriate definition of the relations between the execution, legislation and the judiciary would contribute to the constitution's ability to duly fulfill the function of securing fundamental rights and freedoms.

Constitutional Engineering

The note expressed that perfect institutional design was possible only upon good "constitutional engineering". The note continued: "Good constitutional means designing a constitution that not causes but solves crises and that enables not cumbrous but a functional political system." The note concluded:

"In this context, constitutional engineering must focus on the following:

• Establishing appropriate check and balance mechanisms between the institutional elements constructing the constitutional system,
• Designing institutional preferences in entirety rather than in form of partial revisions, and
• Evaluating the foreseeable outcomes of the current institutional model thoroughly with respect to the entire political system.

Current studies in the field of constitutional engineering develop solutions to be employed in designing governmental systems and thus election systems. In the current period in which Turkey debates constitution making, alternative system designs based on the knowledge of constitutional engineering can pave the way for a fruitful constitution making process."