Today’s young Turks desire hope, joy, and the chance for meaningful lives.
Make no mistake: this wave of discontent sweeping Turkey is different. It is neither purely political nor strictly economic—it is fundamentally generational. At its heart lies a generation who grew up under a single leader, now rebelling against the hopelessness of our time.
According to the first comprehensive survey by Ankara’s Toplum Çalışmaları Enstitüsü (TÇE), conducted right after the March 19, 2025 arrest of Ekrem İmamoğlu, Erdoğan’s primary challenger, around 70% of early demonstrators were between 18 to 24 years old. Another 24% were between 25 to 34. Crucially, when asked why they were protesting, an overwhelming 81% cited anxiety about their future. Only 11% pointed specifically to the injustice against İmamoğlu. It's not that this seemed unimportant to them, but they insisted that their protest was systemic. They didn't want this to be politics as usual, signaling a generational crisis of confidence.
This anxiety about future was also visible in OECD’s Risks That Matter Survey of 2023. There 80.5 percent of 18 to 29 years old in Turkey were anxious about not being able to earn their living properly. The ones with anxieties regarding finding proper lodgings were around 63 percent of the same age group. Young people know that life is going to be harder for them than it was for their parents. (https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/main-findings-from-the-2022-oecd-risks-that-matter-survey_70aea928-en.html)
Today’s young Turks—those aged between 18 and 34, so a mix of Gen Z and younger millennials—have known only Erdoğan’s Turkey. The oldest among them were just children when Erdoğan’s AK Party came to power in 2002. They’ve grown up being told that education and democracy would open doors for them. Yet now, as they enter adulthood, they find those doors locked.
Turkey currently has 7.1 million university students, with around 1 million graduating each year. Many enter a bleak job market offering salaries barely above minimum wage. Counting recent graduates from the last five years, approximately 12 million young Turks face profound economic uncertainty. Including their families, this number balloons to around 50 million, making up a comfortable majority within Turkey’s population of 85 million.
Families supported their children’s education at tremendous cost because they believed that university diplomas will secure their future. Yet they discovered these diplomas—especially those from provincial universities—offer limited career prospects.
Notice that when Erdoğan’s AK Party came to power there are around 76 universities in Turkey, while today, after 24 years in power the number of Turkish universities has increased to 205. With numbers rising prematurely, the quality of a university diploma has become a serious issue. Easier access to university education has led to a situation where all diplomas are not considered to be equal, contrary to high expectations of the recipients.
The implicit promise of a diploma, that a university education somehow prepares a person for a career, has long been eroding by the increase in the number of universities at each and every province. Yet it was still such a shock to see Ekrem İmamoğlu’s university diploma being annulled so easily. It laid bare the arbitrary nature of all qualifications.
Protests initially erupted at Istanbul University’s Beyazıt campus before spreading nationwide. Note that İmamoğlu was a graduate of İstanbul University before his diploma was annulled. Why significant? You need to have a university diploma to be eligible for standing as a candidate for presidential elections. No university diploma means no candidacy in presidential elections.
All very telling. The outrage intensified when İmamoğlu was arrested on corruption charges soon after his diploma was annulled. These young Turks understood clearly: the ballot box, their only remaining hope for change could also be so easily stripped of its power. Under the new rules, dissenters could be jailed, political opposition silenced, and democracy undermined.
These incidents were not isolated political events—they symbolized the systematic dismantling of future opportunities for an entire generation. This was their breaking point, their basta moment. Young Turks weren’t simply defending İmamoğlu; they were fighting for their own future.
In recent years, many graduates from Turkey’s elite universities have chosen to emigrate, seeking better lives abroad. Turkish engineers and doctors have found opportunities in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States. Yet an overwhelming majority of university graduates remain trapped in uncertainty at home. Their economic hardships have been exacerbated by Erdoğan’s economic policies, which triggered severe inflation in 2023. Although inflation has recently decreased from 75% to around 40%, the cost of living remains intolerable for those earning low wages.
Turkey’s next presidential election is scheduled for 2028. Under the current constitution, Erdoğan cannot run for another term. In order to stand for elections in 2028, Erdoğan has two options, an early election or constitutional amendments. With an early election decision, he can be a candidate once again. With this first hurdle over, there comes the second problem of President Erdoğan, It is not enough for him to have the chance to stand for the next presidential election as a candidate, but he has got to win the election, too.
Yet if he would get the chance to stand for elections with an early election decision of the Turkish Parliament, according to the current constitution, he has to get a majority in order to win in the coming presidential election.
However, especially with this generational conflict, the chance of him earning a majority looks bleaker every day. So a scenario based on early elections to get the right to stand for elections looks to be too risky for Erdoğan.
That’s why getting the chance to stand for elections by constitutional amendments looks highly likely. That way, he would have the chance not only to amend the article restricting him to have a consecutive third term but also to change the article specifying the "50 percent plus 1" majority rule to win the presidential election.
A simple “first past the post” rule improves his chance of winning greatly. Especially if there would be more than two candidates in the second round of elections. First round with many candidates, second round with those that passed a 7 or 10 percent threshold in the first round just paves the way.
If the rational choice for Erdoğan is to opt for a constitutional amendment to get the right to stand for the upcoming presidential election for a consecutive third term, then he has two options. If the Parliament amends the constitution with a 360 majority, then there is the need for a referendum to approve constitutional amendments. Too risky again, I have to note.
Hence the best bet is to bring together a 400 strong coalition of the willing to do the job without going to a referendum for the final approval. Bringing a 400 strong coalition of the willing to change the constitution, allowing the incumbent to stand for a consecutive third term looks to be the best option then.
Recent political maneuvering—weaponizing courts, arresting opposition figures—is part of Erdoğan’s new strategy to retain power. The idea is to create more divisions within the opposition to force for many candidates in the first round of elections. More splinter groups, the easier it will be for the president.
However, these actions have not only intensified youth disillusionment, deepening the generational divide, but also makes Turkish economy more vulnerable. Making it harder for the stabilization efforts to succeed. Just have a look at the portfolio shift away from Turkish lira assets after İmamoğlu arrest. More bitter politics, more policy uncertainty, less economic stability and higher cost of living.
If elections take place soon, young Turks will play a decisive role, and surveys indicate their votes will not favor Erdoğan. Their discontent is not simply about replacing a leader but about reclaiming their future.
Today’s young Turks are not just seeking political reform. They desire hope, joy, and the chance for meaningful lives. They reject the prospect of a future overshadowed by men who have never had an email address in their lives. The era defined by Erdoğan’s long rule feels increasingly outdated, much like Gabriel García Márquez’s portrayal of exhausted, autocratic leadership in The Autumn of the Patriarch.
This generational revolt is deep-rooted. Young Turks are determined not only to voice their frustration but to secure a future filled with possibilities. They are fighting against despair, determined that Turkey’s future should belong to the young and hopeful—not to the tired, stubborn old men.
